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Abstract—The present debate on constitutional rights aims to protect the individual
against the intrusive power of the state. Analysing the precarious relationship between
art and money, the authors argue that constitutional rights need to be extended into
the regimes of private governance. This requires four fundamental changes. (1)
Constitutional rights can no longer be limited to the protection of individual actors.
Instead, they need to be extended to guarantees of freedom of discourses. (2) The
new experience of the twentieth century is that totalizing tendencies have their origin
not only in politics, but also in other fields of action, especially in technology,
science, and the economy. Thus, a discursive concept of constitutional rights should
be directed against any social system with totalizing tendencies. (3) Instead of
concentrating on centres of economic and social power, constitutional rights in the
private sphere should focus on the specific communicative medium of the expansionist
social system involved. (4) This excludes the direct analogy of a 'right' as a quasi-
spatial exclusion zone. More significant guarantees of discursive autonomy could be
found in a 'proceduralization' of constitutional rights.
1
Federico Fellini v Silvio Berlusconi—the grand old man of Italian cinema against
the new media tycoon, Italy's former prime minister—was a cause celebre in the
late 1980s. Fellini was furious. Canale 5, Berlusconi's aggressive commercial
TV station, had mutilated his masterpiece Otto e mezzo. Numerous commercial
breaks had interrupted the flow of the film's artistic messages and distorted its
integrity as a piece of art. Fellini claimed that his personal 'moral right' which
was protected by the Italian constitution had been violated and asked the court
to prohibit TV commercial breaks interruption of Otto e mezzo.1 Fellini's suit
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was only part of a broader campaign by famous Italian film makers like Franco
Zeffirelli and Francesco Germi to protect the integrity of their films against
commercial breaks.2 First the courts hesitated. But, the Serqfino case in 1989,
in which Germi succeeded in an action, signalled a decisive shift of direction.
In contrast to regulations in other EU countries which in general allowed
commercial breaks in films, even of those with artistic quality, and imposed only
limits on the number,3 the Cone di Appello di Roma invoked the human rights of
the Italian constitution in order to protect artistic films from being deformed by
commercial breaks.4 One may welcome this result as sound cultural policy,' but
why should the claim of the artist in this kind of case be regarded as raising a
question of constitutional rights?
Art sponsorshhip is our second example in the triangle of art, money, and
constitutional rights. At issue here is whether the relationship between art and
money can be, or ought to be, treated as a matter of constitutional law, given
that the latter has traditionally been regarded as regulating the activities of
agencies of the State. Seen from this perspective, commercial sponsorship of the
arts, though now widely seen as enabling rather than threatening artistic ex-
pression, raises similar questions to those considered in the Serafino case. In
Great Britain, Germany, and Switzerland an exponential growth in business
sponsorship has been observed.6 Business firms systematically finance artistic
events (exhibitions, concerts, dance, or film festivals) in order to improve their
corporate image. They keep the efficiency of business sponsorship activities
constantly under review and make the continuation of these activities dependent
on their success in marketing terms. Some critics argue that the expressive
freedom of artists is thereby endangered and demand state supervision of arts
funding; others welcome commercial sponsorship and demand that the state
retreats from any subsidizing activities.7 The question we pose here, however, is
whether such sponsorship can be seen as a constitutional issue, and if so, in
what sense.
2
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The classical formulation of constitutional rights both in law and political
philosophy would tend to answer this question in the negative.8 Constitutional
rights, it is generally said, are human rights: they are rights of the individual
against the intrusive power of the State. Yet in our two examples we are dealing
with artistic expression and business organizations. Where is the individual that
needs protection against the State? In the classical view the relation between art
and money is simply not contemplated by constitutional rights.
We aim to challenge this view. The relation between freedom of art and the
economy, it seems to us, is one of the key areas of constitutional rights.9 Indeed,
its reformulation in terms of constitutional rights is one of the most pressing
problems today, comparable to the problematic relation between freedom of
science and the economy. An adequate understanding of the historical and
contemporary role of constitutional rights in the 'private sphere' is blocked by
the narrow view that these rights are constituted exclusively in the triad of
individual-power-State. This narrow view is due to an unholy alliance between
liberal political philosophy and the procedures of public law. Separation of State
and society, the dichotomy between a public and a private realm, the reduction
of social life to the actions of individuals, the view of the State as the organization
of society, contractual theories of the State, society subsumed under the exclusive
dichotomy State v individuals—these elements are responsible for an exclusively
individualistic formulation of constitutional rights.10 They would not be so
influential in constitutional law were they not reinforced by the procedures of
public law. When individual citizens have the right to sue state agencies for the
violation of constitutional rights, then this two-party relation of plaintiff and
defendant constructs a social reality which is effectively governed by the di-
chotomy of individual v State. Non-individual aspects of constitutional rights
are subsumed under this dichotomy.
The heated debate about a Bill of Rights which is taking place in Britain also
tends to concentrate on the individual-government relation." For the role of
constitutional rights in the private sphere the most advanced proposal is that the
Bill of Rights should apply to 'any act or omission by or on behalf of any person
(including the Crown) in the performance of any public function'.12 While this
is a remarkable step beyond a merely government-oriented view of human rights
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it still underestimates the reconstructive efforts reducing them to a change from
'governmental institution' to 'public function'. It is questionable whether the
private/public distinction is a suitable criterion for the applicability of con-
stitutional rights in the private sphere. Indeed, it may turn out to be coun-
terproductive. It tends to nullify the advantages that a 'Diceyan' view on
fundamental rights which judges public institutions and private actors by the same
standards may have on human rights.13 The more fundamental reconstruction of
constitutional rights which we suggest can be summarized in three points: (1)
Constitutional rights do not only protect die freedom of individuals, rather,
they extend to other non-individual expressions of freedom in society. (2)
Constitutional rights are directed not only against state action, but also against
the intrusions of other expansive social systems. (3) Constitutional rights do not
exclusively deal widi power relations, they curb any means of communication
which tend to colonize other sectors of social life.
Sociological analysis is not much impressed by die rhetorics of pre-legal in-
alienable constitutional rights diat spring from the natural endowment of human
individuals and that the State has to recognize as such. Rather, sociology looks
to underlying historical processes diat make visible why constitutional rights
emerge as a central feature of modern society.14 For pre-modem stratified
societies, constitutional rights as a protected sphere of individual action are
unthinkable." The individual is comprehensively embedded in social contexts,
the legal formula is 'status' not 'right'; even die term 'ius' denotes a reciprocal
contextual relationship and not a right in the modern sense.16
Rights as individual entitlements come about only widi social differentiation.
Their relevance is tied to die historical emergence of individual spheres of action
which is typical for modern societies.'7 Herein lies die key to understanding die
historical role of constitutional rights. It is social differentiation that creates a
variety of autonomous spheres of action, die autonomy of which is protected by
complementary constitutional rights. The sphere of the self-realizing individual
is only one among many spheres of autonomy in society which are guaranteed
by constitutional rights as a social institution. Social differentiation and die
emergence of constitutional rights are complementary historical processes. While
in stratified societies, political action is closely intertwined widi religious, legal,
13
 cf Carol Hariow, ' "Public" and "Private" Law: Definition Without Distinction' (1980) MLR 241; P. Cane,
'Public and Private Law: A Study of the Analysis and the Ute of a Legal Concept* in J. Eekelaar and J. Bell (cdj),
Oxford Essays in Jurisprudent* (Third Strict, 1987) at 57.
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economic, and social meaning and inherently limited by this social context,
modern politics and the State in its autonomy lose their inherent limitations and
tend to politicize the rest of society. But here, other spheres of communication
have gained an equal status of autonomy:18 religion, education, economy, science,
law, health sector, mass media, and art. In the expansionist tendencies of
the modern State, the historical process of social differentiation threatens to
undermine itself. The self-destructive circle has the following stages: differ-
entiation of politics-autonomy-loss of inherent limits-expansionist tendencies-
politicization of other sectors-risk of de-differentiation. Constitutional rights
emerge as a social counterinstitution which breaks this vicious circle." They
protect social differentiation against its self-destructive tendencies. They are not
a creation of the law, but are pre-legal as a 'social institution, as a self-limitation
of politics. Of course, the law positivizes, interprets, and stabilizes them. But
this should not obscure the fact that constitutional rights are first and foremost
social institutions which underlie the institution of law. This relation between
the social and the legal explains why certain countries that have only a weak
legal institutionalization of constitutional rights nevertheless have them in-
stitutionalized socially.20 And it explains why the legal imposition of constitutional
rights has only a limited effect in those countries where social differentiation
and its complementary institutions are not present as a social basis for the legal
superstructure.21
In a sociological perspective we can see why the classical individualist in-
terpretation of constitutional rights is too narrow and should be complemented
(not replaced) by an institutional interpretation.22 The simple dichotomy of State
v society does not consider the multiplicity of social discourses, the autonomy
of which is defined by constitutional rights. The reduction of constitutional
rights to individual spheres of action does not take into account that freedom in
society is realized not only in the individual sphere but in different communicative
spheres as well.23 How meaningful is it to protect individual freedom of opinion,
if there are no constitutional guarantees for the communicative process, for the
institution of a 'free press'? Is the freedom of academic teaching and research
18
 See Niklas Luhmann, T h e Autopoiesis of Social Systems* in F. Geyer and J. van der Zouwen (eds),
Sodocybemeuc Paradoxes: Observation, Control and Evolution of StIfSteermg Systems (London, 1986) at 172-92.
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66 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies VOL. 18
exhausted by the individual freedom of the university scholar? Or is the com-
municative process of research and publication itself a matter of constitutional
protection? Is it sufficient to grant political liberty to the citizens or is it the
process of collective will formation that needs to be protected against intrusions
from the State?24
This is not an anti-individualist view which denigrates constitutional protection
of individual spheres of action. On the contrary, social differentiation has been
accompanied by a hitherto unknown autonomization of the individual. Individual
dignity and individual freedom are vulnerable against the intrusion of politics,
and as the experiences of totalitarian regimes have shown, are in desperate need
of the protection afforded by constitutional rights. But this should not lead to
view, in each and every constitutional right, a simple concretization of individual
freedom as the dominant view in constitutional law has it. Constitutional rights
can be seen as polyvalent, protecting both individual spheres of action and social
spheres of action against the expansionist tendencies of the State. In particular,
we can distinguish: (1) those constitutional rights that are predominantly oriented
towards protecting the sphere of action of the individual (right to individual
liberty and right to personal dignity); (2) those that protect simultaneously
individual and social spheres of action (freedom of opinion, of art, of education,
of research); and (3) those that protect predominantly an autonomous sphere
of social action (property, family, political constitutional rights).25
This is not a collectivist view which identifies collectives and social institutions
as originally entitled to constitutional rights and sees the individual as a mere
instrumental functionary of those collectives.26 On the contrary, the two fun-
damental constitutional rights, the right to individual liberty and the right to
personal dignity are the main guarantees for the individual sphere of action
outwith the large collectives, directed particularly against large scale organizations.
The point is that apart from individual spheres of action there are spheres of
social autonomy that need constitutional rights protection against the colonizing
tendencies of state politics and that cannot be reduced to mere annexes or
derivations of individual autonomy. It is the decentering of the individual, not
its withering away which is asked for in the field of constitutional rights.27
However, one has to reckon with conflicts between individual and social
autonomy, situations in which individual autonomy endangers social autonomy:
the journalist violating the freedom of the press; the scholar violating freedom
of research; the citizen violating freedom of the political process. The law has
to deal with these conflicts. In these cases constitutional rights may need to be
" See Kart-Heinz Ladeur, Postmodern Rtchtsthtorie (Berlin 1992) at 176ff.
" See Luhmann, n 15 at chi 5-7; Willke, n 23 at 164-77. Clapham, 1993, n 10 at 145-9, comes dose to this
typology when he distinguishes between human rights that are related to human dignity and others that are related
to democracy.
26
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Selves and Collectivities' (1994) 61 Uimtnity ofChicago Law Rtviea 1213-43.
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protected against their individual bearer, as absurd and dangerous as this may
sound to advocates of a strictly individualist approach to constitutional rights.
Let us return to Otto e mezzo and the film makers' protest against the violation
of their constitutional rights. In some of these cases the film makers had given
their approval to any sort of diffusion of their films. The contracts contained
such broad formulations that their approval would appear to cover commercial
breaks.28 And indeed, the Italian courts who were willing to protect films against
commercial breaks in general, made the exception that there would be no
protection of the constitutional right if the film maker had given approval to the
mutilation in question.29 According to the court the 'author has the right to sue
against any act that damages his work in terms of deformation, mutilation or
any substantive modification. This includes the protection of the author also
against the use of his work for commercial advertisement in a way that offends
the dignity of the author'. But this protection ends if die author has given his
prior consent.30
Indeed, such a distinction is in line with an individualist interpretation of the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of art. It is in conflict, however, with its
institutional interpretation which would demand the protection of art even if the
artist has agreed to the damaging interference. Of course, freedom of art has its
individual dimension. It protects the free expression of the artist's personality
and—in a broader interpretation—the social and economic conditions of the
artist's activities. But at the same time freedom of art is a fundamental right
which is concerned with the discourse of art itself. Art in this sense is a self-
reproductive communicative process that includes all kinds of communicative
observations of artistic distinctions, from the creation of artistic artefacts to their
enjoyment by the public and their critique.3' At the centre of this process is not
the artist, neither as a god-like genius, nor in his right to personal expression,
nor in his private property of the piece of art, rather it is the discourse between
artist and public which is attracted by the artistic artefact.32 Freedom of art is
not primarily related to the unfolding of the artist's idiosyncratic personality, but
to the social construction of alternative realities, to the discovery of counterworlds
to everyday communication, to the creation of an imaginary world through
artistic artefacts. They protect the conditions of possibility of an autonomous
28
 In practice it happens very often that an author agrees by contract to commercial breaks. Chardin asks if the
author by doing so does not commit 'moral suicide'. See V. Chardin, 'Le droit moral du realisatcur sur Poeuvre
audiovisuelle achevee' (1989) 21 CaUen du drmt d'auuur.
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discourse of art.33 In extreme cases, this might lead to a protection of the artist
against himself, to a protection of the play of distinctions around the artefact
against its mutilation, if necessary against the will of the artist or his heirs.34 In
our case Otto e mezzo, Fellini's constitutional right is non-renunciable, non-
disposable. The court protects freedom of art in its non-individual institutional
aspects as a non-distorted communication process, even if the author has given
his consent.
This view opens unconventional approaches to protect the self-reproduction
of art against modern dangers. These dangers lie not only in the old repressive
power of the State or in more recent forms of political corruption of art. They
lie especially in forms of exclusive privatization of art.3' If art needs constitutional
protection as a self-reproductive discourse centred around artistic artefacts, then
a right of public access to private art collections should not be excluded from
the outset. In this spirit the law of intellectual property would have to be
redirected from a person-centred view that protects the dignity, personality, and
creativity of the author, to a discourse-related view that instead of the author's
personality protects artistic communication by preserving the artistic patri-
monium of society.36
This brings us to the second question: Against whom are constitutional rights
directed? The classical answer is unequivocal: against the power of the State. It
denies any protection against 'private' infringements of basic rights, particularly
against economic organizations:
Although most liberal states protect basic rights against abuse of power by agencies of
the State, their laws generally fall short of adequate protection of civil liberties against
the economic powers by employers.37
This failure of labour law to protect constitutional rights extends to most other
spheres of 'private' life. It is true, the historical role of basic rights has been to
protect the precarious results of social differentiation against their politicizan'on.38
The historical outcome was a self-limitation of politics. In long-term political
struggles the State was compelled via constitutional rights to respect spheres of
33
 On the autonomy and closure o f a n , tee Luhmann, • 31 at cfa 4 .
34
 Graber, n 2 at 183 .
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34
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individual and social autonomy. Private spheres of individual life as well as
society-wide discourses—religion, science, art, law, economy—were protected
against the intrusion of political power. And it is no wonder that the totalitarian
regimes of the twentieth century dismissed constitutional rights as outdated
liberal institutions that hindered the political mobilization of all sectors of society.
Consequently, the re-institutionalization of constitutional rights in 1945 and
1989 on the Continent was a necessary condition not only for individual liberties
but for a renewed autonomy of a variety of social discourses against their
politicization. To characterize the anti-totalitarian changes in Europe as a return
to liberal capitalism is therefore too narrow a view of these developments, which
combine a high degree of social differentiation with an institutionalized guarantee
of the autonomy of social discourses.
There is no room, however, for complacency about constitutional rights. If
one looks at the risks for social differentiation, the 'end of history5 is not in
sight. It is true that constitutional rights were directed against the risks of de-
differentiation stemming from the expansionist repressive State. But this is a
historical contingency depending on the expansive potential of a social system
in a given society at a given time. Silicon Valley, we submit, carries potentially
as many risks for the freedom of science, education, and research as Lyssenkow's
socialist biology. In a sense, its dangers for cultural autonomy may be even
greater. Lyssenkow's political biology transformed science straightforwardly into
politics, turned a scientific theory into a political ideology, and by this trans-
formation destroyed its inner dynamic. Silicon Valley, die symbol for a close
symbiosis between economic profit and scientific truth, seems more dangerous
because it preserves die scientific machinery in order to exploit it for economic
purposes. There is a more subtle danger for the loss of academic autonomy and
scholarly integrity if the direction of research is predominantly determined by
conceptions of economic and social utility generated elsewhere. Is there something
like a 'horizontal effect' of constitutional rights that would protect die fragile
structures of social differentiation against colonizing tendencies of social systems
other than politics?
The contemporary debate on constitutional rights has developed three diverse
doctrines of dieir horizontal effect in the 'private' sphere which we find promising
but wanting.3' One doctrine resorts to the minimal position of an 'indirect'
horizontal effect of constitutional rights.40 In private law, constitutional rights
cannot be applied directly since they are designed for the individual-state relation.
However, they have an indirect effect in private law; their inherent values can
be realized in the interpretation of general clauses like 'good faith', 'public
" For an extension of civil liberties into British contract and labour l»w, Collins, n 37 at 184-215. For a recent
comparative analysis of horizontal effect of constitutional rights which refers mainly to the Strasbourg Convention
and Britain but which discusses also the US and Canada, Clapham, n 10. In the continental legal literature the
discussion on the horizontal effect was initiated in the 1950s. An overview of the development of the doctrine in
Saladin, n 10 at 307ff.
40
 See Peter Saladin, 'Grundrechte und Privatrechtsordnung' (1988) 22 Sdmxixmcht Juraun-Ztmmg 373-84,
382f.
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policy1, and standards of a 'reasonable person'. Arguably, this doctrine makes
the point that constitutional rights cannot be transferred from the traditional
political context to the economic context without a thorough re-formulation.
But this doctrine does not develop criteria as to under what circumstances
constitutional rights can be invoked against economic action.
Another is the 'state action' doctrine which expands constitutional rights
beyond the narrow field of governmental action and applies them to all types of
economic and social action, however under the condition that an element of
state action can be identified.41 Under the conditions of a mixed society with
comprehensive state intervention this leads to a quite dramatic expansion of
constitutional rights, for example against racial discrimination by exclusion of
membership in a private club if only a state-granted liquor licence exists. However,
the theoretical criterion is wrongly chosen—state action instead of effective
infringement of individual or social autonomy whatever its source.
A third doctrine stresses 'economic and social power' that threatens individual
autonomy.42 Wherever in society organized centres of power do exist, individuals
should enjoy the protection of constitutional rights. Again, we would criticize as
too narrow an orientation which this time does not try to identify indirect state
action in private contexts, but looks for structural analogies to the power of the
State and finds them in institutions of 'private government'. It is an obsession
with phenomena of power that tends to overlook other media of communication
as threats to individual and social autonomy.
Instead, it is the specific communicative medium of an expansive social system
against which individual and social autonomy needs to be protected, in analogy
to the protection against the power medium of the State. Economy and technology
are the obvious new candidates. We have already mentioned the Silicon Valley
syndrome as a fundamental threat to academic freedom. And one could even
argue that political discourse itself needs fundamental rights to be protected
against the colonizing tendencies of the expansive economy.43 An ironic reversal
of fronts! Constitutional rights designed to protect economic freedom against
the repressive State might now be used to protect political freedom against
economic influences.44 No doubt that this is a constitutional rights problem of
the first order. Not only does politics need to respect the autonomy of the
economic generalization principle, but the reverse is equally true. 'The economy
needs to respect the genuinely political processes of power accumulation if it is
not to sacrifice its long-term interests to short-term advantages. The economy
needs to respect the political principle of interest generalization and must not
give in to the temptation of its decentralized decision structure: namely to buy
41
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specific advantages via special deals. The economy needs to address politics with
its interest in such a way that the State can take over political responsibility
for its decisions."" Recent political scandals in Germany and Italy concerning
the financing of political parties by powerful economic groups (Flick and
Enimont) are cases in point. Certain lobbying practices point into a similar
direction.
What about art and money? There is a long-standing critique of the fetishization
of art which makes the capitalist economy responsible for tendencies of reification
of culture.46 By the commodification of art, die effects are directed toward die
exchange value of die art object. Enjoyment becomes a matter of sheer popularity
of art. The autonomy of art is lost.
Insofar as art responds to socially existing needs, it has become to a large degree a
profit-oriented enterprise which goes on and on as long as it is profitable, but it veils
behind its perfection that it has died long time ago.47
We think this critique reflects adequately the endangerment of die autonomy of
art dirough the colonizing tendencies of the economy. However, we are not sure
to what extent diis realization should provoke such deep pessimism as to die
inevitability of art's loss of autonomy. Historically, economic prosperity has
tended to coincide widi a blossoming of the arts, and after 200 years of capitalism,
art is still diriving in a state of lively imperfection. It seems to us diat it is not
die interdependence as such of art and money diat creates die threat to the
autonomy of art, but die concrete ways in which these interdependences are
institutionalized. The question is whether contemporary society is in a position
to develop social institutions that counteract a too direct dependency of art from
economic action. The distinction between code and programme might be fruitful
here, as well as die distinction between loose and tight coupling.48 Whereas the
code of art is the expression of die autonomy of die discourse of art itself,
aesthetic programmes which are historically contingent decide on die conditions
under which die code operates. Translated into our language, Adorno's critique
aims at a situation in which the code of art becomes replaced by the code of the
economy. We would distinguish diis from die more productive constellation in
which the code of art remains intact while the programmes of art communication
are influenced by the economy and other subsystems in society. And then
everydiing depends on a development in which the relation between art and
money evolves from tight to loose coupling. Of course, law plays a radier limited
role in such social structures supporting cultural autonomy. As in the case of
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the expansive State, it is the social institution of constitutional rights that protects
social autonomy, and law's role is limited to stabilizing these rights and shaping
them to a certain degree.
There seem to be two ways that the law can react to infringements of artistic
autonomy through non-political mechanisms. One is the direct analogy to
constitutional rights in relation to the State. The other is a legal arrangement
that is not moulded in the legal form of a 'right', rather an equivalent in effect
but in different legal forms. Let us go back to our two examples to illustrate
these two ways.
In the Serqfino case, the direct analogy has been tried.49 The moral right of
the author has been re-interpreted as a constitutional right which protects the
integrity of artistic communication against infringements not by the State, but
by an economic enterprise. The social situation that art's autonomy is endangered
by expansionist tendencies of economic transactions, is translated into the legal
procedure of an individual rights claim against an economic organization. This
works satisfactorily as long as the economic interference with art is structurally
similar to a political interference which can be blocked by granting subjective
rights.
Economic infringements, however, are often more subtle than a direct in-
terference into a sphere of autonomy. Business sponsoring is a case in point
where the construction of individual rights against economic interference would
be useless. Here, a constitutional duty of the State to guarantee a multiplicity
of financial sources for art seems to be a more productive device which could
have effects on the autonomy of art equivalent to the rights construction.50 The
autonomy of art seems to be better protected if artistic communication is financed
by a plurality of sources and a monopolistic dependency of art on one source of
financing is avoided. The consequence is that government should not retreat
from interventionist support of cultural life and content itself with the replacement
of state sponsorship by business sponsorship. Rather, it should attempt to
influence the interdependencies of art and money in two ways. First, the State
should use its financial resources to influence business sponsorship so that it
resorts to more indirect, more abstract forms of sponsorship which leave more
space for the autonomy of art. Tax law, matching techniques" and the creation
of art foundations seem to be the institutional lever which might be used to
impose a 'code of business sponsoring' on corporate actors." They would
systematically favour those sponsorship contracts that actually respect artistic
autonomy. Second, the other institutional device would be a legal principle of
financial pluralism in matters of art. The State would have to guarantee a
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plurality of independent financial sources that would be an external condition
for artistic autonomy and plurality. A kind of subsidiarity principle would be
governing: a reliance on a multiplicity of private, local, communal, and regional
financial sources which would be guaranteed by the State. Of course, such
protective measures can only accompany constitutional rights which themselves
need to be firmly rooted in social and cultural practices.
